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IN THE WAKE OF LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 
COMPANY: APPLYING THE DISCOVERY RULE TO DETERMINE THE 
START OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR PAY DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIMS 
NANCY ZISK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congratulations. You have been offered a renewal of your employment 
contract and, with it, a salary increase. You wonder if anyone else has received a 
raise, but you are afraid to ask. While at lunch with your co-workers, you feel 
compelled to inquire whether anyone else received a raise, even though you 
know it is not polite.1 If you do not ask, you may run the risk of losing the right 
to bring a pay discrimination claim challenging your employer's decision to give 
you a lower raise than it gave your male co-workers doing substantially similar 
work. This is at least how it seems after the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter 
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.2 
In Ledbetter, the Court held that a female employee's complaint of pay 
discrimination was time-barred when she did not file her claim within a 180 day 
period, because she discovered that her paychecks were lower than those of her 
male co-workers in substantially similar jobs much later.3 In so holding, the 
Court appeared to place an employee in the untenable position of having to see 
what is "often hidden from sight"4 to bring a timely claim under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Indeed, when Title VII's short limitations period6 
collides with the prevailing "social norms" and employers' rules that prohibit or 
discourage employees from discussing or comparing their salaries,7 employees 
may lose the opportunity to vindicate their rights under Title VII.8 Immediately 
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 1. Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way": Workplace 
Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 *2004). 
 2. See 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
 3. Id. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to e-17 (2008). 
 6. Under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged unfair employment practice unless the 
complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or local agency, in which case the period is 
extended to a maximum of 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
 7. Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 168. 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
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after the decision was rendered, commentators warned of its implications and 
Congress moved to limit its reach.9 
The initial reaction to the decision, however, may have been unwarranted. 
This article examines whether Ledbetter, in fact, requires an employee to violate 
the "social norm" by asking co-workers how much they make to preserve his or 
her right to challenge pay disparity.10 When read closely, the decision should 
not lead to a major shift, if any shift at all, in the law as it existed before, and in 
this regard the lower court rulings are consistent.11 It may be read, instead, as a 
case lacking either in proof of discrimination or a plaintiff's failure to litigate the 
case to prove discrimination.12 While over 1300 courts have cited the Ledbetter 
decision in some capacity since its publication, its impact appears to be limited 
 
 9. The decision was rendered on May 29, 2007, and editorials were published two days later. 
See, e.g., Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18; Editorial, Sterile Thinking on 
Pay Equity, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2007, at C18; Editorial, Life vs. The Law: by Reading Statutes Too Rigidly in 
Rendering Opinions, The Supreme Court Can Be in Denial of Reality, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A26. 
On July 31, 2007, the House of Representatives passed a bill known as the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act, which, if it becomes law, would amend Title VII and provide that "an unlawful employment 
practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation . . . when an individual is affected by 
application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice . . . ." H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. 
§ 3 (as passed by House, July 31, 2007). This language responds to Congress' concern that the 
Ledbetter decision "undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in 
which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation 
decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress." Id. § 2. The Senate introduced a 
similar bill, the Fair Pay Act of 2008, which is currently pending. S. 2945, 110th Cong. (2008). See also 
Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 353 n. 4, 354 (2008) (citing editorials and other commentaries warning of 
the decision's import and suggesting that "Ledbetter is part of a much deeper and more potentially 
devastating conceptual shift that is taking hold in employment discrimination law"). More recent 
decisions, however, portend a more favorable environment for the protection of employees' rights. 
See, e.g., CBOCS W. Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct.1951 (2008) (interpreting a Reconstruction-era 
statute known as Section 1981, which bars racial discrimination in employment, to include 
protection against retaliation); Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008) (holding by a vote of six 
to three that the section of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that applies to federal 
government employees gives them protection against retaliation for complaining about age 
discrimination); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008) (ruling that if an 
employer claims that a "reasonable factor other than age" accounts for the disproportionately 
negative impact that a layoff or other action has on older workers, it is up to the employer to prove 
it, rather than up to the employees to disprove the validity of the defense); Fed. Express Corp. v. 
Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008) (holding that failure to file the proper form to make a complaint 
with the EEOC does not deprive an employee of the ability to go into court later and file a lawsuit); 
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008) (rejecting the employer's argument 
that testimony of non-parties regarding the discrimination was never relevant and should always be 
excluded). 
 10. Bierman &Gely, supra note 1, at 170. 
 11. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson's Inc., No. C 06-04000 MHP, 2007 WL 2701915 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 13, 2007) (distinguishing Ledbetter and suggesting that decision will not be followed by other 
California courts). 
 12. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). Ledbetter did not contest 
the lower court's ruling that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Goodyear had acted with 
discriminatory intent in making the only two pay decisions that occurred within the statutorily 
prescribed time period. The Ledbetter Court observed that the plaintiff made "no claim that 
intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the charging period or that discriminatory 
decisions occurring before that period were not communicated to her." Id. at 2169. 
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by its very specific facts. This article examines the state of the law before and 
after Ledbetter and concludes that the limitations period for any discrimination 
claim should start only after the victim is or should be aware of the existence 
and source of an injury; a determination which must be made on a case-by-case 
basis.13 Section II examines the requirements for filing a timely claim of pay 
discrimination and reviews Ledbetter's analysis of what kind of an act or 
occurrence starts the running of the limitations period. Section III examines the 
difficulty in identifying the discrete act that triggers the limitations period for a 
pay discrimination claim under Title VII and the limited reach of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Ledbetter. Section IV reviews the lower courts' application of 
Ledbetter and, based on that review and the realities of the workplace, Section V 
proposes a case-by-case application of the discovery rule for identifying when 
the limitations period is triggered in a pay discrimination claim. In Section VII, 
this article concludes that the limitations period for a pay discrimination claim 
should be triggered when an employee discovers or should discover a disparity 
in pay that violates Title VII, whether the act that leads to that discovery is a 
decision to award raises or set salaries or when employees are talking at lunch 
and someone mentions the size of his or another co-worker's paycheck. 
II.  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING A TIMELY CLAIM OF PAY DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Statutory Regime 
Congress enacted a series of statutes "to address the pervasive problems of 
employment discrimination."14 These laws include Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,15 Section 1981 of the Civil War Reconstruction statutes,16 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),17 the Equal Pay Act (EPA),18 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).19 While the statutes 
define different types of discrimination, each addresses discrimination in 
employment and defines a limitations period in which an employee can bring a 
 
 13. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedren & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting 
the application of the discovery rule to a Title VII claim and defining accrual of such a claim "as soon 
as a potential claimant either is aware, or should be aware, of the existence of and source of an 
injury"). 
 14. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1 (7th ed. 2008) 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (ensuring that all persons have the same right to make and enforce 
contracts, including the making, performance, modification, and termination of employment 
contracts). 
 17. 29 U.S.C.§ 621 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon age). Accord 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (prohibiting gender-based discrimination in compensation). The 
EPA does not protect other classifications, like race or national origin, like Title VII does. See § 2000e-
2 (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). 
ZISK_FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:42:50 PM 
140 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 16:137 2009 
claim.20 With Title VII defining the "paradigm," the first step in determining 
whether a claim is timely under any statute is determining when the 
discriminatory act takes place.21 To do that, one must "identify with care the 
specific employment practice that is at issue."22 Once identified, the 
determination of when the employment practice "occurs" will define the time for 
filing a charge of employment discrimination.23 Eluding precise definition, the 
Supreme Court has explained that an act occurs "on the day that it 'happened.'"24 
Similarly imprecise is a lower court's suggestion that a discrete act of 
discrimination occurs when it "takes place."25 This imprecision may allow for the 
necessary flexibility when faced with the various ways and the differing 
contexts in which employment discrimination arises. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
affirmed this when addressing the question of when a discriminatory act 
"occurs:" "The answer varies with the practice."26 Therefore, a factual analysis of 
any case will be critically important in determining when a limitations period 
begins.27 
 
 20. Under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unfair 
employment practice unless the complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or local 
agency, in which case the period is extended to a maximum of 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) 
(2000). The EEOC may then investigate the claim and either pursue the claim or issue a right to sue 
letter, which entitles a complainant to file suit in federal district court. Id. See also Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166–67 (2007). The ADEA and the ADA, like Title VII, 
require a plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to bringing suit in federal district 
court. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000). Title I of the ADA incorporates the 
other requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), but the ADEA permits a complainant to file suit 
after sixty days without first receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC. 29 U.S.C § 626(d)(2) 
(2000). See, e.g., Hodge v. N.Y. Coll. of Podiatric Med., 157 F.3d 164, 168–69 (2d Cir. 1998). The EPA 
does not require a plaintiff first to file an administrative complaint and has a two-year statute of 
limitations for violations that are not "willful" and a three-year period for violations that are 
"willful." 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2000) (applying the statute of limitations defined in 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) 
(2000)). 
 21. MICHAEL J.ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 595 (7th ed. 2008). 
 22. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing Nat'l R.R Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–11 
(2002)). See also Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 904 (1989) ("Assessing timeliness therefore 
'requires us to identify precisely the "unlawful employment practice" of which [petitioners] 
complai[n].'") (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980)). 
 23. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165. To challenge an employment practice, Title VII requires an 
employee to file a charge within either 180 or 300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). If an employee fails to submit a timely charge, the 
employee will be barred from challenging the alleged discriminatory conduct in court. Ledbetter, 127 
S. Ct. at 2165. Other discrimination statutes have limitations periods of other lengths, but all require 
a complainant to file a charge within a certain time period or be barred from bringing the claim. See, 
e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 117–18 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 656, (1987) 
("Because there is no specified federal statute of limitations applicable to § 1981 cases, the district 
court was required to use the state limitations period most analogous to the civil rights cause of 
action."). See also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985) (selecting the "most analogous state statue 
of limitations" to apply to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim) (internal citation omitted). 
 24. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110 (quotes in original). 
 25. Brantley v. Muscogee County Sch. Dist., No. 4:06-CV-89, 2008 WL 794778, at *6 (M.D. Ga. 
Mar. 20, 2008). 
 26. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 122. 
 27. Id. 
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B. Identifying the "Act" or "Occurrence" that Triggers the Start of the 
Limitations Period 
In some cases, certain discriminatory acts are "easy to identify."28 They 
include acts "such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer or refusal 
to hire."29 Other acts, in contrast, may be difficult to discern. Specifically, an "act" 
of pay discrimination, like the one at issue in Ledbetter, may be particularly hard 
for an employee to identify.30 Despite the factual difference from a pay disparity 
case, the Ledbetter Court relied on cases involving obvious acts like termination 
or a denial of tenure without analyzing how one rule for all cases will affect 
victims of pay discrimination.31 
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,32 the employee, as described by the 
Ledbetter Court, "was forced to resign because the airline refused to employ 
married flight attendants, but she did not file an EEOC charge regarding her 
termination. Some years later, the airline rehired her but treated her as a new 
employee for seniority purposes."33 The employee sued, recognizing that any 
suit based on the original discrimination was time-barred but arguing that the 
airline's refusal to give her credit for her prior service gave "present effect to the 
past illegal act and thereby perpetuate[d] the consequences of forbidden 
discrimination."34 The Court noted that the airline's "seniority system [did] 
indeed have a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits,"35 but held that 
the discriminatory act was the employee's forced termination, which occurred 
outside the limitations period.36 Despite the difference between a forced 
termination and the pay disparity that grew gradually over a term of years, the 
Ledbetter Court described the Evans precedent as speaking "directly" to the 
point.37 
 
 28. Id. at 114. See, e.g., Smithers v. Wynne, No. 07-11945, 2008 WL 53245, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 
2008) (claims of being passed over for promotion are allegations of discrete acts). 
 29. Nat'l R.R Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 
(2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . "). See also Smithers, 2008 WL 53245, at *2 (plaintiff's claims 
of being passed over for promotion are allegations of discrete acts); Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. at Davis, No. 2-03-02591, 2007 WL 3046034 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007) (holding that being 
excluded from a wrestling team is akin to a claim of termination and failure to hire or promote and 
thus appropriately characterized as discrete acts). 
 30. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct 2162, 2178–79 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) ("Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter's case, in small increments; cause to 
suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time."). The difficulty of discerning when 
pay discrimination occurs is discussed more fully below. See infra Part III. 
 31. See Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 
(1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
 32. Evans, 431 U.S. at 553. 
 33. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167(citing  Evans, 431 U.S. at 554–55). 
 34. Evans, 431 U.S. at 557. 
 35. Id. at 558. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2007). 
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The Ledbetter Court also relied on Del. State Coll. v. Ricks,38 with facts 
distinguishable from Ledbetter, but which the Court found "[e]qually 
instructive."39 In that case, a college librarian, Ricks, alleged that he had been 
discharged because of his national origin.40 At some point outside the limitations 
period, Ricks was denied tenure but was given a final, nonrenewable one-year 
contract that expired a little over a year after his tenure was denied.41 He 
delayed filing a charge with the EEOC until almost a year after the denial of his 
tenure, but he argued that the EEOC charging period ran from the date of his 
actual termination rather than from the date when tenure was denied.42 Holding 
that the limitations period began to run when the "tenure decision was made 
and communicated," the Court held that the employee's claim was out of time.43 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Evans and Ricks, the plaintiff in Ledbetter did not suffer 
constructive termination or denial of tenure—things that she would have 
understood to be adverse job action. She did not even suffer a reduction in pay. 
Indeed, in some of the years in which she received negative evaluations that, 
according to the appellate court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, triggered 
the limitations period, she still received a raise in pay.44 Her negative 
performance evaluations only gradually led to the differential in pay and her 
loss was only obvious when she compared her pay with the salaries of men in 
similar jobs.45 It took years, in fact, for the differential to become obvious.46 
The Ledbetter Court also relied on Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.47 
There, the defendant employer changed the way in which seniority was 
calculated under a collective bargaining agreement.48 Before the change, all 
employees at the plant in question accrued seniority based simply on years of 
employment at the plant.49 Under the new agreement, as described in Ledbetter, 
"seniority for workers in the more highly paid (and traditionally male) position 
of 'tester' depended on time spent in that position alone and not in other 
positions in the plant."50 This affected female testers several years later when, 
during an economic downturn, they were laid off due to low seniority as 
calculated under the revised agreement.51 Their layoffs prompted their claims 
alleging that the changes in the collective bargaining agreement had been 
adopted with discriminatory intent "'to protect incumbent male testers and to 
 
 38. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
 39. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 40. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254. 
 41. Id. at 252–53. 
 42. Id. at 254. 
 43. Id. at 258. 
 44. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. 
Ct. 2162 (2007). 
 45. Id. at 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
 46. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See infra Part III. 
 47. Lorance v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
 48. Id. at 902. 
 49. Id. at 901–02. 
 50. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2007) (citing Lorance, 490 
U.S. at 902). 
 51. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902. 
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discourage women from promoting into the traditionally-male tester jobs,' and 
that '[t]he purpose and the effect of this manipulation of seniority rules has been 
to protect male testers from the effects of the female testers' greater plant 
seniority and to discourage women from entering the traditionally-male tester 
jobs.'"52 Here again, the "one-time discrete act"53 is easily distinguished from 
Ledbetter's gradual loss of pay when compared with her male counterparts.54 In 
Lorance, it was apparent to the employees that "each petitioner had earned the 
right to receive a favorable position in the hierarchy of seniority among 
testers . . . and respondents eliminated those rights" when the defendant 
employer changed the seniority system in the collective bargaining agreement.55 
It was this "diminution in employment status" of which the employees were 
fully aware, and missing from the Ledbetter decision, that started the running of 
the limitations period.56 
The Court also noted Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.57 There the 
employee was faced with a number of discrete acts, each separately 
discriminatory, and each "a separate actionable 'unlawful employment 
practice.'"58 Some of the acts were challenged within the statutory limitations 
period and others were not, and the Court made clear that only the discrete acts 
that "occurred" within the appropriate time period could be grounds for 
complaint.59 The Court distinguished the employee's claims of hostile work 
environment as "different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves 
repeated conduct."60 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the "'unlawful 
employment practice' . . . cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs 
over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a 
single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own."61 
Pay discrimination claims may be more like the hostile environment claims 
than the claims in Evans, Ricks and Lorance.62 Indeed, the facts in Ledbetter are 
more similar to those found in a case like Morgan and its description of a hostile 
environment claim, which is created "over a series of days or perhaps years."63 
Like the gradual creation of a hostile working environment, pay discrimination 
may take years to develop and may take longer than that before the affected 
 
 52. Id. at 903 (quoting plaintiffs' complaint). 
 53. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 55. Lorance v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905–06 (1989). 
 56. Id. at 906. The Lorance decision is no longer effective, repudiated by Congress' amendment 
to the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000). In that amendment, Congress made explicit 
that "an unlawful employment practice occurs . . . when the seniority system is adopted, when an 
individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the 
application of the seniority system or provision of the system." Id. 
 57. 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
 58. Id. at 114 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). 
 59. Id. at 115. 
 60. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 
(1989); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
 63. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). 
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employees are aware of that disparity.64 Therefore, the limitations period, and 
the triggering of it, should be analyzed in reference to these claims, rather than 
to the more discrete termination, denial of tenure or other more obvious 
"diminution in job status."65 The problem grows even thornier for the employee 
faced with pay decisions that are not shared among employees, as is often the 
case.66 The facts in Ledbetter illustrate the difficulty in identifying the triggering 
act.67 
III.  THE DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING THE DISCRETE ACT OR OCCURRENCE IS 
ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACTS IN LEDBETTER 
A. The Ledbetter Facts 
In Ledbetter, the plaintiff sued her employer for pay discrimination.68 The 
plaintiff was a supervisor at Goodyear Tire and Rubber's plant in Gadsden, 
Alabama, from 1979 until her retirement in 1998.69 She worked for the latter part 
of her career as an area manager, "a position largely occupied by men."70 When 
she began as a manager, her salary was commensurate with the salaries earned 
by men in the same jobs, but over time, "her pay slipped in comparison to the 
pay of male area managers with equal or less seniority."71 She claimed she 
received poor performance evaluations "because of her sex" and that "as a result 
of these evaluations her pay was not increased as much as it would have been if 
she had been evaluated fairly."72 
 
 64. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 65. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174, aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 
(2007). 
 66. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way": Workplace 
Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004). 
 67. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166. The identification of the triggering act was not before the Court 
in Ledbetter. The plaintiff did not raise the issue of when the statute of limitations actually began to 
run or should have begun to run, despite evidence suggesting that she did not discover—and could 
not have discovered—the discrimination until years after the discrimination had occurred. As noted 
by the dissent: "Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter's case, in small increments; cause 
to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time." Id. at 2178–79 (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting). The record in Ledbetter also reflected that the plaintiff "had only limited access to 
information regarding [her] colleagues' earnings," making it even more difficult to know of the 
discriminatory disparity in pay. Id. at 2182. 
 68. Id. at 2165. The plaintiff made several claims, under both the EPA and Title VII. The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the EPA claims but allowed the 
claims under Title VII to proceed to trial. Id. Under the EPA, the plaintiff's claim might have 
survived a motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because, under the EPA, 
"each alleged discriminatory paycheck may be considered a new, discreet discriminatory action." 
Delima v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 06-328-JE, 2008 WL 1882842 at *20 (D. Or. Apr. 23, 2008) 
(internal citations omitted). The plaintiff did not pursue this issue on appeal, so the Supreme Court 
did not address it. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165. 
 69. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2166 (majority opinion). 
ZISK_FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:42:50 PM 
 IN THE WAKE OF LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY 145 
The discrepancy between Lilly Ledbetter's pay and the pay of others took 
years to grow.73 This alone might have made it difficult for Ledbetter to identify 
a triggering point for the limitations period to begin to run.74 However, a bigger 
impediment to identifying the discrimination and recognizing that the period 
for filing a claim had begun may have been due to the fact that she continued to 
receive pay increases even after receiving negative performance evaluations.75 
As explained by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with one exception, her 
supervisor "consistently ranked Ledbetter at or near the bottom of her co-
workers in terms of performance."76 Despite these negative evaluations, 
however, her supervisor "suggested, and she received, a 5.28% increase over her 
existing salary, the largest percentage increase given to any Area 
Manager . . . ."77 Thus, it would be difficult to recognize that these evaluations 
amounted to "acts" or "occurrences" triggering the limitations period.78 
In addition to the pay increases she received, Ledbetter also got mixed 
messages from her supervisors about the reasons for their salary decisions. 
When she did not receive a raise one year, she was told that her performance 
was "sub-standard"79 and there was no indication that the negative evaluation 
was based on her sex.80 Moreover, her denial of a pay raise occurred in the midst 
of employee layoffs, which included a "long list" of people in departments all 
over the plant, so she was encouraged simply to retain her employment.81 Far 
from a "diminution in job status" required to start the running of a limitations 
period, Ledbetter might well have thought that her status was secure.82 
B. The Litigation and What the Court Did Not Decide 
After several years had passed, when Ledbetter was receiving paychecks 
that were smaller than those of her male counterparts, she filed a claim for 
discriminatory pay disparity. The district court, over the objections of the 
defendant employer, allowed Ledbetter's Title VII claim to proceed to trial.83 The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding, that it was "more likely 
than not that Defendant paid Plaintiff an unequal salary because of her sex."84 
Based on its conclusion, the jury recommended damages for back pay, mental 
 
 73. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 
S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
 74. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 75. Ledbetter, 421 F. 3d at 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2007). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 79. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. 
Ct. 2162, 2178 (2007). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1175. 
 84. Id. at 1176 (quoting jury's special verdict form). 
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anguish and punitive damages.85 In response to the defendant's argument that 
the claim was time-barred, the court said simply that the "jury's finding that 
Plaintiff was subjected to a gender disparate salary is abundantly supported by 
the evidence . . . ."86 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's 
decision not to grant the defendant judgment as a matter of law, finding that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove that discriminatory intent motivated the only 
two pay decisions that were made within the limitations period.87 Importantly, 
the plaintiff did not seek review of this holding on appeal.88 She relied, instead, 
on the receipt of disparate pay to justify her claims and to bring them within the 
limitations period.89 The question before the Supreme Court was limited to: 
"Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when 
the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the 
result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the 
limitations period."90 
In response, the Supreme Court held that Ledbetter's claim was untimely 
because the "pay-setting decision," rather than the receipt of the paychecks 
resulting from that decision, is the discrete act that started the running of the 
limitations period.91 However, the Court did not clarify what the precise "pay-
setting decision" had been, or how that decision would have been understood by 
the plaintiff, since these questions were not before the Court.92 The Court, 
therefore, did not have to decide whether pay-setting decisions that were within 
the limitations period were, in fact, discriminatory or were, for that matter, even 
the kinds of "acts" or "occurrences" that would start the limitations period 
running. The plaintiff conceded that no discrimination took place during the 
limitations period and that ended the matter for the Court: "Because Ledbetter 
did not file timely EEOC charges relating to her employer's discriminatory pay 
decisions in the past, she cannot maintain a suit based on that past 
discrimination at this time."93 
 
 85. Id. The district court denied Goodyear's motion for judgment as a matter of law but remitted 
the entire award to $360,000, including the statutory maximum of $300,000 in compensatory and 
punitive damages and $60,000 in back pay. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1189. 
 88. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166 (2007). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (quoting plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari). 
 91. Id. at 2165. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2176. 
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IV.  LEDBETTER'S IMPACT ON LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
A. Ledbetter's Application to Cases Involving Discrete Acts 
Over 1300 courts have cited the Ledbetter holding.94  Many relied on it to 
dismiss claims where the plaintiff failed to file the claim within the appropriate 
limitations period triggered by a "discrete act" of discrimination.95 Although 
many of the cases did not concern issues of pay discrimination but more obvious 
"discrete acts" of discrimination, other courts did address pay discrimination 
claims. In these cases the courts directly applied Ledbetter's holding when there 
were "discrete acts" to trigger the limitations period. For example, the District 
Court in the District of Columbia recently considered whether a complaint was 
timely filed under the ADEA.96 In that case, the plaintiffs' complaint arose in 
connection with a change from one pay system to another. Under the new 
system, each employee was categorized into a particular "pay band," which 
defined a salary range for which each employee in the category would be 
eligible, and the employer was able to adjust that range on an annual basis.97 
The employees who were entitled to raises received them in different packages, 
either over the course of the year or in a lump sum. Based on these differences, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the older employees were compensated less favorably, 
and the employer intended this result.98 Although the employees argued that 
the limitations period began when they first began receiving their pay raises, the 
court relied on Ledbetter to hold that the limitations period started when the pay 
bands were set.99 
 
 94. See, e.g., Carter v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 503 F.3d 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding 
that plaintiff's filing an EEOC questionnaire within 180 days of alleged sexual discrimination 
provided the defendant adequate notice of claim and was timely filed); Vollemans v. Town of 
Wallingford, 928 A.2d 586 (Conn. App. 2007) (concluding that the time for filing an age 
discrimination claim begins on the day of actual termination and not on the day defendants 
provided plaintiff notice of his termination). 
 95. See, e.g., Smithers v. Wynne, 2008 WL 3245 (11th  Cir. 2008) (holding, as a matter of law, that 
non-promotion claims are allegations of discrete acts and are time-barred if not brought within the 
statutory limitations period); Dela Cruz v. Piccari Press, 521 F. Supp. 2d 424 (Ed. Pa. 2007) (holding 
that a plaintiff may not assert a retaliation allegation not mentioned in the timely filed EEOC 
complaint because the defendants were not put on notice of the retaliation allegation). 
 96. Coghlan v. Peters, 555 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2008). The ADEA "provides a federal 
government employee two alternative avenues to judicial redress." Id. Like under Title VII, an 
employee may bring his claim directly to federal court "so long as, within 180 days of the allegedly 
discriminatory act, he provides the [EEOC] with notice of his intent to sue at least 30 days before 
commencing suit." 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c)–(d) (2000). Alternatively, an employee may choose to pursue 
his claims administratively in the first instance and then file suit in federal court if he is dissatisfied 
with the results of the administrative process. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b)–(c). As the Coghlan court 
explained, under the second alternative, employees must contact an EEOC counselor "within 45 days 
of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 
days of the effective date of the action." Coghlan, 555 F.Supp. 2d at 191 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 
1614.105(a)(1)). Accordingly, if an employee's complaint relies on "conduct that occurred more than 
45 days prior to the initiation of administrative action," it will be time-barred. Coghlan, 555 F. Supp. 
2d at 191 (quoting Velikonja v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 97. Coghlan, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 192–93. 
 98. Id. at 193. 
 99. Id. at 198. 
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Adhering to the Supreme Court's directive, the district court "drew a sharp 
distinction between discriminatory pay-setting decisions" that are "intentional 
acts that 'consummate' a discriminatory pay practice—and 'subsequent 
nondiscriminatory acts that [merely] entail adverse effects resulting from' those 
decisions."100 In contrast to the Ledbetter Court, which did not consider whether 
the "pay-setting decisions" actually put the employee on notice that the 
limitations period for her claim had begun to run, the court in Coghlan squarely 
addressed the issue. Looking for the "intentional acts that 'consummate' a 
discriminatory pay practice,"101 the district court concluded that they were the 
employer's annual decisions that set the pay ranges because, after those 
decisions were made, "it was a foregone conclusion" what the employees' salaries 
would be.102 The court concluded, therefore, that any claim made after the 
limitations period had expired from the date of those decisions were time-
barred.103 These facts contrast sharply with the facts in Ledbetter where, at the 
time of her performance evaluations, it was not a "foregone conclusion" that her 
pay would be less than male employees with similar jobs. To the contrary, after 
at least one negative evaluation, she received a raise.104 
B. Avoiding Ledbetter's Application in Cases Where the Triggering Act is Hard 
to Discern 
In cases where an employer's acts and the discriminatory nature of them 
are harder to discern, courts have been reluctant to apply Ledbetter. Indeed, one 
California court described the holding as a "rather cramped interpretation of pay 
discrimination" and refused to apply it, suggesting that other California courts 
will not follow it either.105 In Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson's Inc.,106 the court decided 
that the Ledbetter decision did not apply to the facts before it. It could have 
limited its discussion of the case to just that, but instead, the court noted that 
"there is no authority as of this date that California courts will adopt this rather 
cramped interpretation of pay discrimination, given the sharp dissent of four 
members of the Court."107 Careful to limit its observation to state courts only, the 
court noted that "California courts have not adopted or applied Ledbetter to cases 
 
 100. Id. (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169–70 (2007)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at 199–200. See also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (charging period runs from 
the date when "the operative decision was made—and notice given—in advance of a designated date 
on which" adverse consequences would occur) (emphasis added) (relying on Del. State Coll. v. 
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)); Denman v. Youngstown State Univ., 545 F. Supp. 2d 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008) 
(employee alleging facts fundamentally distinguishable from those in Ledbetter, because employer's 
decision to deny Denman's raise and non-renew her contract are clearly discrete acts). 
 104. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. 
Ct. 2162 (2007). See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8 (charging period runs from the date when "the operative 
decision was made—and notice given—in advance of a designated date on which" adverse 
consequences would occur) (emphasis added). 
 105. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson's Inc., No. 06-04000, 2007 WL 2701915, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at *4 n.3. 
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arising under state law. Thus, it may well be that even on facts similar to those 
in Ledbetter the California courts would rule differently."108 
While not explicitly refusing to follow Ledbetter, one court of appeal in 
California refused to apply it and went to great lengths to distinguish the facts 
of the case before it from the facts in Ledbetter. In Hammond v. County of L.A.,109 
the plaintiff had been a nursing instructor with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
Department who claimed that a new supervisor discriminated against her on the 
basis of her race and age.110 The employee alleged that this supervisor replaced 
her as an instructor in the classroom with "new people and young people."111 
She also alleged that her supervisor made derogatory racial remarks and 
retaliated against plaintiff for telling the supervisor's supervisor about these 
problems.112 The record reflected that there was "ongoing harassment and 
discrimination" against the plaintiff.113 
The defendant contended that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations under the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act.114 
Under that statute, a complainant has one year "from the date upon which the 
alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred."115 To interpret the 
statute, the California court looked to interpretations of Title VII.116 It considered 
the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter but did not apply it to the facts before 
it.117 In an effort to distinguish Ledbetter, the Hammond court noted that "[u]nlike 
the supervisors in Ledbetter," the supervisor in the case before it "did not just 
make a single decision based on age or race outside the limitations period that 
continued to affect plaintiff adversely during the limitations period."118 In 
contrast, said the court, the supervisor in Hammond "initially removed plaintiff 
from the classroom in early 2002, but then allowed her to teach classes on a 
sporadic basis . . . ."119 
The California court could have decided that the supervisor's initial 
decision to take the employee out of the classroom was the same type of 
decision made by the Ledbetter supervisor to evaluate her poorly for 
discriminatory reasons. If the court had done so, the employee's claims would 
have been time-barred.120 To avoid that result, the court instead decided that, 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 390. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 392. 
 114. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 (West 2008). 
 115. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12960(d) (West 2008). 
 116. Hammond v. County of L.A., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 386, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ("Our courts 
frequently turn to federal authorities interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . for 
assistance in interpreting the FEHA and its prohibition against sexual harassment.") (citations 
omitted). 
 117. Id. at 399–400. 
 118. Id. at 400. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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despite the supervisor's decision to demote the employee, the supervisor's 
continued actions supported the employee's claims.121 
Other courts have also avoided the result in Ledbetter, finding a variety of 
ways to distinguish the facts in the cases before them.122 In O'Grady v. Middle 
Country Sch. Dist. No. 11, the court considered an employee's claim that every 
time she received a payment of her health benefit costs under an employment 
retirement plan, her former employer discriminated against her on the basis of 
her age.123 She brought suit under the ADEA, which has a limitations period 
similar to the one in Title VII.124 The defendant employer argued that the 
plaintiff's claim was time-barred, based on the fact that the retirement plan had 
been adopted years before the plaintiff filed suit and the employee filed suit 
over eight years after she retired.125 In response, the plaintiff argued that every 
time she received payment from the retirement plan, a new cause of action 
accrued.126 The plaintiff in O'Grady, unlike the Ledbetter plaintiff, argued and 
proved that the retirement plan was itself discriminatory.127 Distinguished in 
this way from Ledbetter, the plaintiff's claim survived the defendant's argument 
to bar the claim.128 In its holding, the court relied on the Supreme Court's 
suggestion that "Ledbetter's paychecks may have retriggered the limitations 
period if her employer had issued paychecks using a discriminatory pay 
structure" but that issue was not before the Ledbetter Court.129 By relying on the 
"discriminatory pay structure" that was defined by the Supreme Court in 
Bazemore v. Friday,130 the O'Grady court limited Ledbetter's reach.131 Other courts 
have done the same, convinced that "Bazemore is more applicable to this case 
than Ledbetter," saving the plaintiff's claim.132 Indeed, the Supreme Court was 
careful to explain that its holding in Ledbetter "was not intended to overturn 
Bazemore v. Friday, which was distinguished on the grounds that it involved an 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. O'Grady v. Middle Country Sch. Dist No. 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199–200 (E.D.N.Y 2008). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). See Ruhling v. Tribune Co., 
No. CV 04-2430, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007) ("Under Title VII and the 
ADEA, a plaintiff must file an administrative charge . . . within 300 days after a claim accrues."). 
 125. O'Grady, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 199. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 199–200 (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2175 
(2007)). 
 130. 478 U.S. 385 (per curiam ) (holding that the receipt of paychecks based on a discriminatory 
pay structure does retrigger the limitations period). 
 131. O'Grady v. Middle Country Sch. Dist No. 11, 556 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (E.D.N.Y 2008). 
 132. Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Assoc., No. 04-1880, 2007 WL 2908007 at *9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 
2007) (concluding that "Bazemore is more applicable to this case than Ledbetter"). Accord Hulteen v. 
AT & T Corp., 498 F.3d 1001 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering the effects of an allegedly discriminatory 
retirement plan, holding "Ledbetter, as the Court's most recent pronouncement on Title VII, is 
relevant, but does not control this appeal."). See also Pat Huval Rest. & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. United 
States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1361–62 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2008) (new cause of action accrued every time 
payments were made pursuant to "a facially discriminatory . . . statutory scheme"). 
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employer's adoption and intentional retention of a facially discriminatory pay 
structure."133 
The District Court of Connecticut found yet another way to reject an 
employer's argument that Ledbetter required dismissal of a disparate pay claim 
before it.134 In Osborn v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., as in Ledbetter, the plaintiff 
complained that she was being paid less than male employees doing similar 
work.135 There was no question that the employee was aware of the employer's 
decision to allow the disparity because she had repeatedly complained about 
it.136 Therefore, on the strength of Ledbetter, the court could have decided that the 
plaintiff should have filed her claim the first time she received disparate pay.137 
Following Ledbetter's directive that the limitations period begins to run at the 
time of the "pay-setting decision," the Osborn court could have decided that 
Osborn's claim was barred.138 The Osborn court refused to apply Ledbetter, 
however, holding that the employer's continued adherence to the pay-setting 
decision, made outside the limitations period, was proof enough of 
"discriminatory conduct," thereby saving the plaintiff's claim.139 
Like the O'Grady court had done, the Osborn court suggested that if 
Ledbetter had litigated her claim differently, it might have survived: There, the 
plaintiff "ma[de] no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred 
during the charging period," but rather "argue[d] simply that [defendant's] 
present conduct during the charging period gave present effect to 
discriminatory conduct outside of that period."140 These cases suggest that on 
facts similar to the Ledbetter facts, with proof of discriminatory actions taken 
either inside or outside the limitations period, a plaintiff can state a timely claim. 
Discrimination, however, may be difficult to prove, given "the realities of the 
workplace," which is why the "act" or "occurrence" that triggers the start of a 
limitations period must be determined according to the facts of each case.141 
V.  THE "REALITIES OF THE WORKPLACE" DEMAND THE APPLICATION OF THE 
DISCOVERY RULE TO DETERMINE THE STATE OF A LIMITATIONS PERIOD 
"A worker knows immediately if she is denied a promotion or transfer, if 
she is fired or refused employment. . . . When an employer makes a decision of 
such open and definitive character, an employee can immediately seek out an 
 
 133. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2174 (2007). See also Brantley v. 
Muscogee County Sch. Dist., No. 4:06-89, 2008 WL 794778, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2008) (holding 
that because the plaintiff did not rely on a "pay structure that was facially discriminatory," he could 
not rely on when he received the paychecks from that structure to save his claim on limitations 
grounds). 
 134. Osborn v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 377 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 135. Id. at 382–83. 
 136. Id. at 389. 
 137. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169 ("Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days 
after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her."). 
 138. Id. at 2165. 
 139. Osborn, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 389. 
 140. Id. (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2007)). 
 141. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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explanation and evaluate it for pretext."142 It is harder, though, for an employee 
to know of compensation disparities because they "are often hidden from 
sight."143 Moreover, as made clear by the facts that the Ledbetter plaintiff faced, it 
is often the case that an employee may receive a pay raise but, unknown to her, 
her male counterparts receive a higher one.144 Indeed, even if an employee 
suspects that she is being paid a lower salary than she deserves, or that it is 
lower than her male counterparts, "the amount involved may seem too small, or 
the employer's intent too ambiguous, to make the issue immediately 
actionable—or winnable."145 
Employees do not ordinarily know what each other earns, because 
employees do not usually discuss their salaries.146 In addition, while it is the rare 
case where an employer will lie to an employee about what others make, it is 
often the case that employers do not share salary information with its 
employees.147 The plaintiff in Ledbetter did not raise the issue of whether or how 
she could have known that her employer discriminated against her when she 
received her performance evaluations and the Court did note: "We have 
previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a 
discovery rule."148 However, two circuit courts of appeals have adopted that rule 
in age discrimination claims, and at least one district court has applied it to a 
Title VII claim.149 
Both the Third and the Seventh Circuits have noted that the Supreme Court 
in Del. State Coll. v. Ricks150 implicitly acknowledged the application of the 
discovery rule to discrimination claims by noting that the statute of limitations 
began to run "at the time the [alleged discriminatory] tenure decision was made 
and communicated to Ricks."151 Thus, the facts of each case should determine each 
outcome. As stated by the two circuit courts of appeal: "There will, of course, be 
times when the aggrieved person learns of the alleged unlawful employment 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2182. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 2181. See also Bierman & Gely, supra note 1, at 168. 
 147. See Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Assoc. of Pittsburgh, No. 04-1880, 2007 WL 2908007 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 2, 2007) (plaintiff argued that she was entitled to equitable tolling because defendants 
misrepresented her eligibility to receive a salary increase for additional emergency medicine 
certification and failed to disclose that the policy was not uniformly applied); Dodd v. Dyke Indus., 
Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 970 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (plaintiff's cause of action accrued when he discovered the 
fraud in the performance of a compensation agreement). Compare Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 
275 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff did not know what her colleagues earned until a 
printout listing of salaries appeared on her desk, seven years after her starting salary was set lower 
than her co-workers' salaries) (cited in Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181); McMillan v. Mass. Soc. for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 1998) (cited in Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 
2181) (noting that plaintiff worked for employer for years before discovering pay disparity only 
when a newspaper published the salaries of positions like hers). 
 148. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2007). 
 149. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994); Cada v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990); Ohemeng v. Del. State Coll., 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 
(D. Del. 1986) (applying discovery rule in Title VII setting). 
 150. 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
 151. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386 n.5 (emphasis in original); Cada, 920 F.2d at 450. 
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practice, for example, at the very moment the unlawful employment practice 
occurs; in such cases the statutory period begins to run upon the occurrence of 
the alleged unlawful employment practice. However, there will also be 
occasions when an aggrieved person does not discover the occurrence of the 
alleged unlawful employment practice until some time after it occurred. The 
discovery rule functions in this latter scenario to postpone the beginning of the 
statutory limitations period from the date when the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred, to the date when the plaintiff actually 
discovered he or she had been injured."152 
Rather than applying the rule announced in Ledbetter that a pay 
discrimination claim accrues "when the pay-setting decision" is made, without 
regard to when the employee actually knows of the disparity or the 
discriminatory reason behind it, the discovery rule must be part of any analysis 
of these claims. "Typically in a federal question case, and in the absence of any 
contrary directive from Congress, courts employ the federal 'discovery rule' to 
determine when the federal claim accrues for limitations purposes."153 Under 
this rule, a claim will accrue when the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence 
should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the claim.154 The rule 
should be the same for discrimination claims and all other federal causes of 
action: "A claim accrues in a federal cause of action as soon as a potential 
claimant either is aware, or should be aware, of the existence of and source of an 
injury.155 This rule should be the next step after Ledbetter in the evolution of pay 
discrimination law and could be applied to any pay discrimination claim where 
the facts support an employee's claim that she did not and could not have 
discovered that her pay was below what others in similar positions were making 
and that the reason for this disparity was discrimination. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court in Ricks made clear, a decision that will adversely 
affect the employee must be "made and communicated" to the employee to 
trigger the limitations period.156 This rule will allow for consistency and fairness 
to all employees given the realities of the workplace. Where a discriminatory 
pay-setting decision is made, but the employee has no way of knowing that it is 
discriminatory because she actually receives a raise pursuant to that decision or 
the employer offers other reasons for denying her one, Ledbetter's holding 
 
 152. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386; Cada, 920 F.2d at 450. 
 153. Romero v. Allstate Corp., 404 F.3d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 154. Id. See also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 590 (3d Cir. 2005) (the discovery rule 
delays the initial running of the statute of limitations, but only until the plaintiff has discovered: (1) 
that he has been injured, and (2) that this injury has been caused by another party's conduct) 
(citations omitted). 
 155. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1988)) (stating this general proposition in 
the context of determining the accrual date of a RICO cause of action). 
 156. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980). 
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should not control and the limitations period should not start to run.157 The 
limitations period should be triggered when an employee discovers or should 
discover the disparity in pay, whether the "act" that leads to that discovery is a 
decision to award raises, or set salaries, or when employees are talking at lunch 
and someone mentions the size of his or his co-worker's paycheck. When it 
becomes a "foregone conclusion" that an employee in a protected class will 
receive less pay than an employee outside of that class, performing similar 
work, and thus, the employee is aware or should be aware of that disparity and 
the reasons for it, then Ledbetter controls.158 
 
 
 157. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2182 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) ("Having received a pay increase, the female employee is unlikely to discern at once that 
she has experienced an adverse employment decision."). 
 158. Coghlan v. Peters, 555 F. Supp. 2d 187, 199 (D.D.C. 2008). 
